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a b s t r a c t
In the highway problem, we are given a path, and a set of buyers interested in buying
sub-paths of this path; each buyer declares a non-negative budget, which is the maximum
amount of money she is willing to pay for that sub-path. The problem is to assign non-
negative prices to the edges of the path such that we maximize the profit obtained by
selling the edges to the buyers who can afford to buy their sub-paths, where a buyer can
afford to buy her sub-path if the sum of prices in the sub-path is at most her budget. In this
paper, we show that the highway problem is strongly NP-hard; this settles the complexity
of the problem in view of the existence of a polynomial-time approximation scheme, as
was recently shown in Grandoni and Rothvoß (2011) [15]. We also consider the coupon
model, where we allow some items to be priced below zero to improve the overall profit.
We show that allowing negative prices makes the problem APX-hard. As a corollary, we
show that the bipartite vertex pricing problem is APX-hard with budgets in {1, 2, 3}, both
in the cases with negative and non-negative prices.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Consider the problem of pricing the bandwidth along the links of a network such that the revenue obtained from
customers interested in buying bandwidth along certain paths in the network is maximized. Suppose that each customer
declares a set of paths she is interested in buying, and a maximum amount she is willing to pay for each path. The network
service provider’s objective is to assign single prices to the links such that the total revenue from customers who can afford
to purchase their paths is maximized. Recently, numerous papers have appeared on the computational complexity of such
pricing problems [1,4,6–9,12,16,14,17,18,8].
A special case of this problem, where each customer is interested in purchasing only a single path (single-minded),
and where there is no upper bound on the number of customers purchasing each link (unlimited supply) was studied by
Guruswami et al. [17], under the name of the tollbooth problem. The authors of [17] showed that the problem is already
APX-hard when the network is restricted to be a tree, and also presented a polynomial time algorithm for the case when all
paths start at a certain root of the tree. In [17], the authors also studied the highway problem, a further restriction where the
tree is a path, and which can also be motivated from a scheduling perspective, and gave polynomial time algorithms when
either the budgets are bounded and integral, or all paths have a bounded length.
✩ A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of SAGT 09.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 919595462964.
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In this paper, we give two complexity results for restricted pricing problems. We first show that the highway problem is
strongly NP-hard, improving a weak NP-hardness of the problem shown by Briest and Krysta [7]. The best approximation
algorithm for the highway problemwas anO(log n)-approximation by Balcan and Blum [2]. Recently, Grandoni and Rothvoß
[15] gave a PTAS. Combined with [15], the results in this paper settle the complexity of the highway problem.
Next, we consider the couponmodel, wherewe are allowed to assign negative prices for the edges. Thismodelwas studied
by Balcan et al. [3], where negative prices connote discounts. Balcan et al. [3] also introduced a discountmodel, amore general
model where items may have non-negative production costs. Thus, for an item, setting a price π(e) to an edge of cost c(e)
will result in a profit of π(e)− c(e)which can be positive or negative. The coupon setting is the special case of the discount
model where c(e) = 0 for all items. They gave a 4-approximation for the uniform budgets case in the coupon model, and
a quasi-PTAS for a special case in which there is an optimal pricing that has only a bounded number of negatively priced
items. In this case, we show that the problem is APX-hard even on a path, and when there is an item that is in the sub-path
demanded by all the buyers, who have budgets from the set {1, 2, 3}. As a corollary to this result, we obtain that the vertex-
pricing problem on bipartite graphs is APX-hard with or without allowing negative prices: in this vertex-pricing problem,
the input is a (multi-)graph with non-negative weights on the edges. The items for sale are the vertices of the graph, and
each edge corresponds to a buyer who is interested in buying the two end-points of her corresponding edge. A similar
result was also obtained via different methods, and independently by Khandekar et al. [19], who also prove that obtaining
an approximation beyond a factor of 2 is NP-hard under the Unique Games Conjecture of Khot [20]. Recently, Popat and
Wu [21] have shown that under the unique games conjecture, there is no constant-factor approximation algorithm in the
coupon model on paths.
A more general problem, where the graph is a tree instead of a path has also been considered. In this case, the problem
is APX-hard already when the tree is a star [17]. In a conference version of this paper [11], we had presented an O(log n)-
approximation algorithm, which has since been improved to O(log n/ log log n) by Gamzu and Segev [13].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start with preliminaries in the next section. In Section 3, we show the
strong NP-hardness for the highway problem, and in Section 4, we present the APX-hardness result for the coupon model.
We conclude in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
In the highway problem, we are given a path P = (V , E) with n vertices and edges e1, . . . , en−1, where ei = {vi, vi+1}.
Given also are a set of buyersB = {1, . . . ,m}where each buyer i is interested in buying a sub-path Ii of the path P . We use
[eil, eir ] to denote the path Ii = {eil, eil+1, . . . , eir} of buyer i, and assume she has a non-negative real budget, denoted by Bi, to
buy this sub-path. At a given set of non-negative prices p : E → R+, a buyer is said to be feasible if the sum of prices of the
edges she is interested in is within her budget, i.e.,

e∈Ii p(e) ≤ Bi. At prices p, letBp denote the set of feasible buyers. Our
goal then, is to find non-negative prices that maximize the profit obtained from the feasible buyers, i.e.,
max
p∈R|E|+

Bi∈Bp

e∈Ii
p(e).
In the coupon model, we have an instance of the highway problem as before. The difference is that we can also assign
negative prices to the edges of P . However, (unlike in the discount model) we impose that in the above sum, only the
customers with positive contribution are considered:
max
p∈R|E|+

Bi∈Bp
max

e∈Ii
p(e), 0

.
We also consider the vertex pricing problem. In this problem, we are given an undirected multi-graph G = (V , E). Now,
the items to sell are the vertices of G, and each buyer corresponds to an edge of G. Thus, we have a budget B(e) ≥ 0 for each
edge e ∈ E. In the vertex pricing problem, we want to set non-negative prices to the vertices of G such that we maximize
profit from the buyers that can afford to buy her vertices. Hence, at a set of prices p : V → R+, an edge e = {u, v} is said to
be feasible if, p(u)+ p(v) ≤ B(e); we denote the set of such feasible edges by Ep. The objective function is
max
p∈R|V |+

e={u,v}∈Ep

p(u)+ p(v)

.
In Section 4, we consider the bipartite vertex pricing problem, where the graph G = (V , E) is restricted to be a bipartite
multi-graph.
In both the highway problem, as well as the bipartite vertex pricing problem, the optimal solution has nice structure
when the budgets of all the buyers are integral. This will be helpful in simplifying some of the arguments in later proofs.
This was observed already in [16,15], but we state and prove it here for completeness.
Lemma 1. In any instance of the highway problem where the budgets of all buyers is integral, the optimal prices are integral
as well.
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Fig. 1. A basic gadget. The gadget consists of 4 edges, and 4 types of intervals A, B, C and D. The interval labels are shown below each interval, and the
budgets are shown above each interval.
Proof. Let B ′ be the set of feasible buyers in an optimal solution. Then, computing the optimal prices reduces to solving a
linear program, viz.,
max

e∈E
pe|{i ∈ B ′ : e ∈ Ii}| :

e∈Ii
pe ≤ Bi ∀ i ∈ B ′ and pe ≥ 0 ∀ e ∈ E

.
It is well known that the constraintmatrix in the above LP is totally unimodular (see e.g. [22]), and hence the optimization
is over an integral polytope. 
For the same reason, the optimal prices in the bipartite vertex pricing problem with integral budgets also turn out to be
integral. The proof follows along the same lines as Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. In any instance of the bipartite vertex pricing problem with integral budgets, the optimal solution is integral.
3. Hardness of the highway problem
In this section, we present our result on the highway problem. Our hardness reduction is fromMAX-2-SAT. AMAX-2-SAT
instance is given by n Boolean variables, {x1, . . . , xn}, and m clauses {C1, . . . , Cm}. Each clause is given by a disjunction of
exactly 2 literals, and the formula is a conjunction of the clauses C1, . . . , Cm. The MAX-2-SAT problem seeks to find a 0/1
assignment to the variables that maximizes the number of satisfied clauses. Via a reduction fromMAX-2-SAT, we prove the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. The highway problem is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. The proof follows by the construction of gadgets for the variables and clauses in a given MAX-2-SAT instance. We
start with a description of the gadgets.
Variable gadget: The gadget for each variable consists of two copies of the following basic gadget, and a consistency gadget.
Basic gadget. The basic gadget consists of 4 edges e1, . . . , e4, and 4 types of intervals A, B, C and D. There are 4 intervals
each of type A and B, labeled a1, . . . , a4, and b1, . . . , b4 respectively. The intervals ai = bi = [ei], i = 1, . . . 4. The intervals
a1, . . . , a4 have budgets of 1, 2, 2, 1 respectively, and the intervals b1, . . . , b4 have budgets 2, 1, 1, 2 respectively. There are
2 type C intervals, c1 and c2, with c1 = [e1, e2], and c2 = [e3, e4]. These intervals have a budget of 3. There are two intervals
of type D, d1 = d2 = [e2, e3]with d1 having a budget of 4, and d2, a budget of 2. The basic gadget is shown in Fig. 1. We now
show that there are exactly two price assignments for {e1, . . . , e4} that gives us optimum profit.
Lemma 3. The maximum profit that can be obtained from a basic gadget is 18, and there are exactly two sets of prices namely
(1, 2, 2, 1) and (2, 1, 1, 2) for the edges (e1, . . . , e4) that achieve this profit.
Proof. From Lemma 1, since the budgets are integral, we know that the optimal solutionmust be integral. Consider the pair
of intervals {ai, bi} for each i = 1, . . . , 4. The maximum profit that can be obtained from such a pair is 2, which is obtained
by setting either p(ei) = 1, or p(ei) = 2.
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Fig. 2. The variable gadget.
Similarly if we consider only the intervals of type D, the maximum profit is obtained by setting p(e2) + p(e3) = 2, or
p(e2) + p(e3) = 4. This gives us 4 price vectors that give us maximum profit from all except the type C intervals, viz.
(1, 1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 2, 2), (1, 2, 2, 1), (2, 1, 1, 2). In the first case, we only obtain a profit of 4 from the type C intervals for a
total profit of 16, while in the second case, we exceed the budget of both the type C intervals giving us a profit of only 12.
Thus there are only two profit maximizing price assignments. 
The price assignments (1, 2, 2, 1) and (2, 1, 1, 2) to the edges e1, . . . , e4 respectively are called TRUE and FALSE
assignments respectively.
The variable gadget is constructed on 8n+ 1 edges (e4n, e4n−1, . . . , e1, h, f1, . . . , f4n), where n is the number of variables
in the MAX-2-SAT instance. Each variable gadget consists of two copies of the basic gadget, along with a consistency gadget.
The consistency gadget ensures that the two basic gadgets have the same price assignment. More formally, let (x1, . . . , xn)
be an order on the variables of the MAX-2-SAT instance. Then, the gadget for variable xi consists of two basic gadgets, B1i
and B2i . B
1
i consists of intervals (customers) interested in the edges e4i−3, . . . , e4i and B
2
i consists of intervals interested in
the edges f4i−3, . . . , f4i. Finally, the intervals ensuring consistency of the gadget for variable xi spans from e4i−1, . . . , f4i−3.
The consistency gadget consists of a single interval that has a budget ofmn2 + 6(2i− 2)+ 6. Finally, we add a new type of
interval, called a type H interval that is interested only in the edge h, and has a budget ofmn2.
Fig. 2 shows the arrangement of the variable gadgets. We now show that the consistency intervals do their job. i.e., if for
a variable gadget, B1i and B
2
i have different price assignments, we obtain a smaller profit than when they are the same.
Lemma 4. The maximum profit of 2mn2 + 6(2i− 2)+ 6+ 36 from a variable gadget and the interval h is achieved only when
both the basic gadgets corresponding to a variable are consistent, and the type H interval purchases edge h at a price of mn2.
Proof. Consider the gadget for variable xi. If the gadget is consistent, we see that both the consistency gadget, and the type
H interval spend their entire budget, and we obtain a profit of 2mn2 + 6(2i − 2) + 6 + 36. Suppose B1i is TRUE and B2i is
FALSE. Then, we are forced to set the price of edge h tomn2 − 1, otherwise the consistency gadget is unable to purchase its
edges and we lose at least mn2 + 6(2i − 2) + 6 from the total profit. However, by setting p(h) = mn2 − 1, the maximum
profit we obtain is at most (mn2 − 1)+mn2 + 6(2i− 2)+ 36, which is smaller than the maximum profit by 1 unit. On the
other hand, if B1i is FALSE, and B
2
i is TRUE, we lose 1 unit from the maximum profit since we cannot raise the price of edge h
to more than mn2, and the consistency gadget is unable to spend its entire budget. Hence, the maximum profit is obtained
only when the variable gadget is consistent. 
We will create several copies of the basic gadgets, the consistency gadgets for each variable as well as several copies
of the H interval to ensure that in an optimum price assignment, the basic gadgets are consistent, and the reduction goes
through. But before we do this, we describe the clause gadgets.
Clause gadgets. The clause gadget for a clause of variables xi and xj runs between the basic gadget B1i and B
2
j . There are
four types of clause gadgets corresponding to the four types of clauses. Each clause gadget consists of one interval. These
intervals have the property that we obtain a certain revenue from the clause interval if and only if the clause is satisfied;
otherwise we obtain nothing. The clause gadgets for the four types of clauses are shown in Table 1. Figs. 3–5 show the clause
gadgets corresponding to clauses of type (xi ∨ xj), (xi ∨ xj), and (xi ∨ xj). The gadget corresponding to (xi ∨ xj) is symmetric
to (xi ∨ xj).
We say that a pricing is consistent if for every variable, the price assignment to the two basic gadgets of the variable
gadget are both TRUE or both FALSE, and the consistency intervals spend their entire budgets.
Lemma 5. Consider a clause C consisting of variables xi and xj and a consistent price assignment to the edges. Then, the intervals
corresponding to C will be able to purchase their desired edges if and only if the corresponding truth assignment to the variables
satisfies the clause C.
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Fig. 3. The clause gadget for clause (xi ∨ xj).
Fig. 4. The clause gadget for clause (xi ∨ xj).
Table 1
This table shows the lengths and budgets of the intervals making up
a clause gadget for the four different kinds of clauses.
Clause Interval Budget
(xi ∨ xj) [e4i−3, f4j−3] mn2 + 6(i+ j− 2)+ 3
(xi ∨ xj) [e4i−1, f4j−3] mn2 + 6(i+ j− 2)+ 6
(xi ∨ xj) [e4i−3, f4j−1] mn2 + 6(i+ j− 2)+ 6
(xi ∨ xj) [e4i−1, f4j−1] mn2 + 6(i+ j− 2)+ 9
Proof. Consider a consistent price assignment, with the edge h having a price of mn2 and a clause (xi ∨ xj). If the clause
(xi ∨ xj) is not satisfied, then the gadgets for variables xi and xj have a FALSE price assignment, and the prices for the edges
in the gadgets for xi and xj are 2, 1, 1, 2, and 2, 1, 1, 2 respectively. Then, it is easy to see that the price of the bundle of the
clause interval in this case ismn2+6(i+ j−2)+4, exceeding the budget of the clause interval. In the other three cases, the
price of the bundle is at mostmn2+ 6(i+ j− 2)+ 3, and the profit from the clause interval is at leastmn2+ 6(i+ j− 2)+ 2
(In the case when both xi and xj are TRUE, the profit ismn2 + 6(i+ j− 2)+ 2, in the two other satisfying assignments the
profit ismn2 + 6(i+ j− 2)+ 3). The proofs for the other types of clauses (xi ∨ xj), (xi ∨ xj), and (xi ∨ xj) are similar. 
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Fig. 5. The clause gadget for clause (xi ∨ xj).
We now describe the final reduction. As mentioned earlier, we have to create copies of the variable gadget, consistency
gadget and theH interval for the proof to go through.Wemake T copies of each basic gadget, of each consistency gadget, and
of the H interval, where any value of T , larger thanm2n3 will suffice for the proof. Observe that for a variable gadget again,
the profit maximizing prices achieve consistency of the variable gadget, and making T copies of the H intervals ensures that
the price of the edge h is set tomn2. Now we can complete the proof.
Suppose the instance ofMAX-2-SAT has k satisfied clauses.We set the prices for the edges corresponding to the two basic
gadgets corresponding to the variable xi to TRUE if xi = 1 and FALSE otherwise. We set the price of edge h tomn2. This gives
a total profit of
S = T · 36n+ T ·
n
i=1
(mn2 + 6(2i− 2)+ 6)+ T ·mn2 + kmn2 + O(kn).
The first term of the sum comes from the basic gadgets of each variable set to TRUE or FALSE, the second term comes from
the consistency gadgets, the third term comes from theH intervals, and the last two terms, from the satisfied clause gadgets.
To show the reverse direction, consider a price assignment that achieves a profit of at least S. We claim that in an optimal
price assignment, the gadgets corresponding to the variables are all consistent, and the edge h has a price ofmn2. Note first
that the maximum profit we can gain from all the clauses is O(m2n2). Now, if we have larger than, say T = m3n2 copies of
each variable gadget, it follows from Lemma 4 that we only lose by making either the variable gadgets inconsistent, or if the
H intervals and the consistency gadgets do not spend their entire budget. Hence, in the optimal solution, the variables are
consistent, and h has a price ofmn2. This then leaves only the clause intervals. Note that our profit maximizing pricing will
try to maximize the number of clause intervals satisfied, since the clause intervals differ by at most O(n) in their budgets,
but their individual budgets themselves are at least mn2. By the obvious assignment of truth values to the variables from
the variable price assignment, we get an assignment that satisfies k clauses. 
4. APX-hardness in the coupon model
In this section, we present hardness results for the highway problem in the coupon model. Our hardness result holds
even for a restricted setting. In this restricted setting, we want the intervals of all buyers to share at least one edge. In other
words, the intervals of the buyers form a clique. We call this case the restricted highway problem. We start by showing an
equivalence between the restricted highway problem in the coupon model, and the bipartite vertex pricing problem.
Lemma 6. The restricted highway problem in the coupon model is equivalent to the bipartite vertex pricing problem.
Proof. Given an instance of the restricted coupon model, we can assume without loss of generality that the buyers share
only one edge. Let us call this edge h. We construct a bipartite graph G = (L ∪ R, E) as follows. First, add a vertex v0 on h,
splitting h into two parts. Let l1, . . . , la be the distinct left end-points of the intervals while traversing the path starting from
v0 and moving left. Similarly, let r1, . . . , rb be the distinct end-points of the intervals encountered while traversing the path
starting from v0 and moving to the right. Then, L = {l1, . . . , la}, R = {r1, . . . , rb}, and for each interval Ii = [li, ri] in the
highway problemwith budget Bi, we put an edge {li, ri} in Gwith budget Bi. This completes the construction of the bipartite
graph.
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Fig. 6. Reduction. Each edge e is partitioned into edges e1 (fat) and e2 (dotted). Which is which is arbitrary. The 1× B = 2means that there is one customer
with budget 2 on this type of edge.
Given prices p for the highway problem with profit Prp, we define the price π(li) = ij=1 p({lj−1, lj}), where l0 = v0.
Similarly, we define π(ri) = ij=1 p({rj−1, rj}) where r0 = v0. It is easy to see that feasible buyers in the bipartite vertex
pricing problem are precisely the corresponding feasible buyers in the highway problem, and their contribution to the profit
is the same. Hence, we obtain a profit of Prp for the bipartite vertex pricing problem as well.
Now, given an instance of the bipartite vertex pricing problem on a graph G = (L∪ R, E), we define a restricted highway
problem instance as follows. We fix a vertex v0 on the line and put the vertices l1, . . . , la in L in an arbitrary order to the left
of v0; similarly, we put the vertices r1, . . . , rb in R on the right of v0, and put an interval [li, ri] with budget Bi. Given prices
π for the bipartite vertex pricing problem, we define the price of edge p(ei) = π(li)− π(li−1). 
Theorem 2. The bipartite vertex pricing problem is APX-hard.
Proof. We prove that the pricing problem on bipartite graphs is APX-hard by a reduction from MAX-CUT on 3-regular
graphs. Given a 3-regular graph G = (V , E), we make it bipartite by placing an extra vertex ve on every edge e, dividing it in
two new edges e1 and e2. For e1 there is one customer with budget 2 and for e2 there are two customers with budget 1 and
one customer with budget 3. We define one extra vertex v0 and define for each v ∈ V an edge av = (v, v0). For each such
edge av there are ten customers with budget 1 and ten customers with budget 2. The bipartite graph partitions into V and
the new vertices V ′ = {ve | e ∈ E} ∪ {v0}. Fig. 6 shows the reduction. (To enhance readability we write prices and budgets
in decimals and number of customers in words.)
Consider any pricing p of the bipartite graph. We may assume that p(v0) = 0 since subtracting p(v0) from all vertices in
V ′ and adding p(v0) to all vertices in V does not change the profit. We will have to take into account though that prices may
be negative.
From Lemma 2, since the budgets are integral, we know that the optimal prices are integral. Hence, the optimal prices
are in {1, 2, 3}. Next, we argue that in any optimal solution, the price of any vertex v ∈ V is in {1, 2}. First note that the
optimal profit from an edge e in the original graph is at most 5. Further, the price for ve can be set such that the profit from
e is at least 3. Now, if any vertex has price 3, then we get 0 profit from any buyers on av while we get a profit of at most 15
from the three edges adjacent to v. But, decreasing the price of v to 2, we obtain a profit of 20, while losing a profit of at
most 15. Hence, it follows that in the optimal solution the price on each vertex is in {1, 2}.
We showed that there is an optimal pricing in which p(v0) = 0 and p(v) ∈ {1, 2} for all v ∈ V . Next we prove that there
is a cut of size k in G if and only if the maximum profit is 20|V | + 4|E| + k. Given a cut of size kwe price the vertices on one
side 1 and on the other side 2. Now consider an edge e = (v,w) ∈ E with p(v) = p(w) = 1. We can get a profit p(e) = 4 by
setting p(ve) = 0 or p(ve) = 1. This is also the maximum profit possible. Similarly, if p(v) = p(w) = 2 then we can get the
maximum profit p(e) = 4 by setting p(ve) = 0. Finally, if p(v) = 1 and p(w) = 2 then we can get the maximum possible
profit p(e) = 5 by setting p(ve) = 0 or p(ve) = 1, depending on how we chose e1 and e2. From the customers on edges
adjacent to v0 we get themaximumprofit of 20 per edge. The total profit is exactly 20|V |+5k+4(|E|−k) = 20|V |+4|E|+k
and this is the maximum possible if the maximum cut is k. To see that the reduction is gap-preserving note that 3|V | = 2|E|
and |E| ≤ 2k. Therefore, 20|V | + 4|E| = 40|E|/3 + 4|E| < 35k. In the conference paper [5], it is noted that MAX-
CUT on 3-regular graphs cannot be approximated within a factor strictly larger than δ = 331/332. This implies that the
inapproximability upper bound for bipartitie graph pricing is at least
δ + 35
1+ 35 =
11951
11952
. 
In the reduction we showed that there always is an optimal pricing of the bipartite graph with only non-negative prices.
Hence, the bipartite graph pricing problem remains APX-hard if we restrict to non-negative prices.
Corollary 1. The highway problem in the coupon model is APX-hard, even when the budgets of the buyers are in {1, 2, 3}.
Note that the optimal solution only used non-negative prices, even when allowed negative prices. Hence we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 2. The bipartite graph vertex pricing problem is APX-hard even when all budgets are in {1, 2, 3} even for the non-
negative version of the problem.
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Guruswami et al. [17] show that the graph-pricing problem is APX-hard even if all budgets are 1. Note that the bipartite
case is trivially solved in that case by setting a price of 1 to all items on one side.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that the highway problem is strongly NP-hard. Along with the PTAS of Grandoni and Rothvoß
[15], this effectively settles the complexity status of the highway problem. It would interesting however, to obtain faster
algorithms for the highway problem. In particular, it is open whether there exists an EPTAS for the highway problem. A
PTAS with improved running time was recently given in [10]. In the coupon model, we showed that the problem is APX-
hard, while under the unique games conjecture, Popat and Wu [21] show that there is no constant-factor approximation
algorithm. The best approximation algorithm is still the result of Balcan et al. [3] yielding an O(log n)-approximation. It
would be of interest to obtain better approximation algorithms for this problem.
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